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Abstract:
Often when failing to solve problems, individuals report some idea of the solution, but 
cannot explicitly access the idea. We investigated whether such intuition would relate 
to improvements in solving and to the manner in which a problem was solved after a 
24- hour delay. On Day 1, participants attempted to solve Compound Remote Associate 
problems, for which they viewed three problem words (crab, sauce, pine) and tried to 
generate one solution word (apple) that could form a compound word with each problem 
word (crabapple, applesauce, pineapple). For problems they failed to solve, participants 
reported whether they had an intuitive sense that they might have solution related pro-
cessing in the back of their mind, similar to a Tip-of-the-Tongue (TOT) experience. After 
an overnight delay, on Day 2 participants attempted to solve unsolved Old problems 
from Day 1 (mixed among New problems). Participants solved more Old problems for 
which they reported a TOT on Day 1 than Old problems without a TOT, demonstrating a 
TOT specific incubation effect. Interestingly, participants reported solving a marginally 
higher proportion of these TOT problems, compared to No TOT problems, with insight. 
Results suggest that intuitive TOT judgments are indicative of subthreshold solution 
related activation that can facilitate eventual problem solving, especially with insight.
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Introduction
Intuition refers to the ability to make a judgment about stimulus properties without being 
able to refer consciously to the knowledge underlying the judgment (Ilg et al., 2007). Some 
empirical studies have demonstrated the reliability of intuitive judgments on lower level 
perceptual stimuli; fewer studies have demonstrated the reliability of intuitive judgments 
in relation to higher order cognitive processes, like problem solving (Bowers, Regehr, 
Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Bolte, Goschke & Kuhl, 2003). Still less 
is known about whether, and how, initial intuitive judgments relate to eventual problem 
solution. The current experiment investigated whether intuitive Tip of the Tongue (TOT) 
judgments would reliably predict which unsolved word problems are more likely to be 
solved one day later, during a second attempt at problem solving.
Problem solving can be characterized as a search through a mental problem space 
aimed at generating a solution (Newell & Simon, 1972). However, individuals are often 
unable to generate a solution during the first attempt at problem solving. A failed attempt 
may partially activate the solution and solution related information, thereby making 
the solution more accessible during subsequent attempts at problem solving (Connor, 
Balota, & Neely, 1992; Seifert & Patalano, 1991). It would be advantageous for solvers to 
be sensitive to which unsolved problems are likely to be solvable during a subsequent 
attempt at problem solving.
There is evidence in the metacognition and memory literatures suggesting that 
individuals are sensitive to which unrecalled items are more likely to be recalled during 
a subsequent attempt at recall. TOT experiences occur when the subthreshold activation 
of an unrecalled target word is strong enough to elicit a metacognitive dissociation, but 
not strong enough to elicit complete recall of the target word (Brown & McNeill, 1966; 
Maril, Wagner, & Schacter, 2001). That is, people may be aware of the concept, and even 
of some aspects of the words’ phonology, but cannot access the full word. An unrecalled 
item that elicits a TOT represents higher subthreshold activation and is more likely to be 
recalled compared to an unrecalled item that elicits no TOT (Schwartz, 1999; 2011).
We used a slightly different type of TOT judgment for problem solving to investigate 
whether these judgments are related to subthreshold solution related activation during 
an initial failed attempt at problem solving and possibly predict improvements in prob-
lem solving following a break in conscious work. In our study, a TOT judgment indicated 
that participants intuited that they were “on to something” or had “the solution in there 
somewhere,” but the concept itself (let alone the lexical item) still eluded conscious access. 
When individuals are unable to solve a problem, they may experience an intuitive TOT 
suggesting that the solution, though not yet retrieved, is being processed. The TOT judg-
ment may signal which problems have solutions activated at a subthreshold level, thus 
which problems are more likely to be solved during a second attempt at problem solving.
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A break in conscious work can facilitate problem solving during a second attempt. 
However, evidence for such incubation effects has been somewhat mixed (Olton, 1979; 
Smith & Blakenship, 1989; Vul & Pashler, 2007). There are various hypotheses that at-
tempt to account for the mechanisms underlying incubation effects such as conscious 
work, opportunistic assimilation, and forgetting fixation. The conscious work hypothesis 
suggests that when an individual discontinues a focused effort on problem solving, they 
continue with more limited amounts of conscious work during the break. Upon second-
ary attempts, solving is improved due to the extra amount of conscious work during the 
break (Smith, 2011; Smith, Sifonis & Angello, 2012). Other hypotheses focus primarily 
on the influence of unconscious processing during the interval between the initial and 
subsequent attempt. The opportunistic assimilation hypothesis suggests that when an 
individual is unable to solve a problem, the problem is tagged in the mind as unsolved. 
When an individual is not working on the problem, cues in the environment that fit the 
potential solution state can be picked up and compared to the unsolved problem. Correct 
cues that represent (or serve as a clue to) the solution are assimilated into the goal state 
and verified as the solution. This hypothesis suggests that individuals are unconsciously 
perceiving stimuli in the environment and relating the stimuli back to the representation 
of an unsolved problem (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995). Lastly, the 
forgetting-fixation hypothesis suggests that incubation effects occur because the delay 
allows the decay of activation of incorrect solutions and solution paths.  During the delay, 
the incorrect activation becomes less accessible and therefore “forgotten.” Once they are 
forgotten, the individual can continue work on a more advantageous path after the delay 
(Smith & Blakenship, 1989).
While various hypotheses attempt to account for the mechanisms underlying incu-
bation effects, the most common assumption is that incubation is the result of continued 
unconscious processing during the break in conscious work (Moss, Kotovsky, & Cagan, 
2007). To our knowledge, no study has addressed whether indicators of subthreshold solu-
tion related activation during a failed attempt at problem solving predict which problems 
are more likely to be solved after an incubation period.
If unconscious solution-related activation contributes to both intuitive TOT judgments 
and incubation effects, intuitive TOT judgments may predict incubation in problem solving 
and the manner in which the solution is eventually generated. Unconscious processing 
is thought to contribute more to solving by insight than solving by analysis (Sternberg & 
Davidson, 1995). During insight problem solving, solvers are unable to consciously report 
the processing that leads to overcoming the impasse, experience the solution as arising 
suddenly, and immediately recognize the correctness of the solution. Initial processing of 
an insight problem produces subthreshold activation of prepotent yet incorrect informa-
tion, often resulting in a failed attempt (Simon, Newell, & Shaw, 1979). Therefore, insight 
problem solving can likely benefit from an incubation period where the activation of 
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incorrect information can diminish (e.g., Smith & Blankenship, 1989; 1991) while solution-
related activation is maintained, or when the activation of solution related information 
can grow stronger.
Taken together, intuitive TOT experiences may indicate subthreshold solution related 
activation and should occur for problems that are more likely to be solved after a delay in 
conscious work, thereby predicting incubation of problem solving. When an individual 
is unable to generate a solution to a problem, the solution may, nevertheless, have sub-
threshold activation. This activation may give rise to an intuitive TOT experience signaling 
to the individual that the solution is present, if inaccessible, in memory. The subthreshold 
solution related activation might persist during a break in conscious deliberation. Upon a 
second attempt at solving, this activation may break the conscious threshold and promote 
the solver’s ability to generate the solution.
Moreover, the subthreshold solution related activation that gives rise to an intuitive 
TOT might specifically promote problem solving by insight. When previously subthreshold 
solution related activation breaks the conscious threshold, the solution may arise suddenly 
producing a moment of insight, while the solver remains unable to explicitly report the 
processing that contributed to their solution. When people perform a visual attention 
task that encourages them to attend to weakly activated information, they subsequently 
improve the number of verbal problems they solve, especially those they report solving 
with insight, suggesting that the ability to attend to or utilize subthreshold activation is 
malleable (Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, Kounios & Beeman, 2012).
This experiment investigated whether intuitive TOT judgments would predict im-
provements in solving when individuals try to solve word problems. We predicted that an 
intuitive TOT experience about the solution to an unsolved word problem would predict 
subsequent solving, specifically by insight, after a 24-hour incubation period.
Methods
Participants
Participants were native English speaking Northwestern University undergraduate volun-
teers, aged 18-22 years old, who participated in the experiment in exchange for course 
credit after signing informed consent. Fifty-seven participants completed the experiment, 
but data from eight participants were excluded from analyses due to being 2.5 standard 
deviations above or below the group mean on four dependent variables (i.e., the frequency 
of correct problems solved on Day 1 and on Day 2, i.e., people who did not solve these 
problems well; and the frequency of reporting a Tip of the Tongue or no Tip of the Tongue 
on Day 1, i.e., people for whom there were too few trials in one category or the other on 
Day 2). Thus, results include data from 49 participants.
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Stimuli
On Day 1, participants attempted to solve 96 Compound Remote Associate (CRA) problems 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003a), and on Day 2 attempted to solve 48 New problems and 
all of their unsolved Old problems from Day 1. CRA problems, a test of creative cognition, 
are patterned after the Remote Associates Test (RAT) (Mednick & Mednick, 1967). Success 
on the RAT has been shown to correlate with success on classic insight problems, such 
as the nine-dot problem and the prisoner escape problem (Dallob & Dominowski, 1993; 
Schooler & Melcher, 1995).
CRA problems include three remotely related words (crab, pine, sauce).  Solvers must 
think of one solution word (apple) that can form a common compound word or familiar 
two-word phrase with each of the three problem words (crabapple, pineapple, apple 
sauce). Reaching a solution requires solvers to think of more distantly related associates 
in order to connect each of the three problem words. CRA problems can be solved with 
a moment of insight, where solvers are unable to report how the solution came to their 
mind, or analytically, where solvers are able to consciously report how the solution came 
to their mind (Bowden & Beeman, 2003b). Self-reports differentiating between insight 
and analytic solving have demonstrated reliable associations with numerous behavioral 
and neuroimaging markers (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003b; Jung- Beeman, et al., 2004; 
Kounios et al., 2006, 2008; Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009). More-
over, neurofeedback training differentially changes performance on problems reportedly 
solved by insight or solved analytically (Haarmann, Georgey, Smaliy, & Dien, 2012).
Procedure
On Day 1, participants attempted to solve 96 problems, consisting of three problem words 
presented on three lines in the center of a computer screen for ten seconds. If participants 
were able to generate a solution, they stated the solution word aloud to the experimenter. 
Following each correct solution, participants reported how they solved the problem, ei-
ther with insight or analytic processing. Detailed descriptions of both insight and analytic 
processes were described to ensure each participant was able to differentiate between 
the two problem solving styles (insight or analytic). Solving with insight was described 
as, “The answer suddenly comes to mind even though you are unable to articulate how 
you achieved the solution.” Solving analytically was described as, “You deliberately and 
consciously tested out different words until you found the solution and you are able to 
report the steps that you used to reach the solution.” Participants were informed that 
these were ideal descriptions, that they should choose which problem solving style most 
accurately described how they achieved the solution, and that no problem solving style 
was any better or any worse than the other. Participants had to judge each solution as 
insight or analytic, because in prior studies, if a third category “other” was available, some 
participants chose that too frequently. Participants were informed that performance on 
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these problems did not measure intelligence, personality or mood and that they would not 
be able to solve every problem. Participants were only allowed to state one word aloud, 
and if they stated an incorrect solution, the problem was considered an unsolved problem. 
If participants were unable to generate a solution, they indicated whether they expe-
rienced: a strong TOT (“The solution is stuck on the tip of your tongue”), a weak TOT (“You 
feel like you have some idea about what the solution could be”), or No TOT. Participants 
also indicated how easy they believed the problem would be for an average student to 
solve. These Ease ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale (1=very easy to 5= very hard). 
The order of the TOT judgments and Ease ratings alternated throughout the experiment. 
Participants were instructed that TOT judgments were in reference to their particular experi-
ence regarding the solution, whereas the Ease ratings were in reference to the experience 
of a hypothetical problem solver (an average student). After the problem presentation 
and subsequent judgments, participants advanced to the next problem. Participants 
were allowed to report a solution to a problem at any time during the experiment, and 
problems solved after the time limit were excluded from further analyses.
At the end of testing on Day 1, participants were told they would receive a new set 
of problems on Day 2, and to not think about the problems anymore. At the start of Day 
2 (i.e., 24 +/- 2 hours), participants were asked if they had thought about the experiment 
since Day 1. No participant reported thinking about the experiment or solving any prob-
lems during the delay.
On Day 2, participants attempted to solve 48 new problems, randomly intermixed 
with their old problems. The Day 2 procedure was the same as the Day 1 procedure with 
the following exceptions: 1) In order to facilitate problem solving, participants were given 
15 seconds, rather than 10 seconds, to solve each of the new and old problems. 2) When 
a participant correctly solved an old problem, after they rated whether they achieved 
the solution via a moment of insight or analytically, they again indicated whether they 
had thought of the answer while outside of the laboratory testing room. 3) If participants 




On Day 1, participants solved an average of 34 problems (35.4%) within 10 seconds and 
an additional 3 problems (3.1%) after the time limit. Because relatively few TOTs were 
reported, strong TOT and weak TOT reports were collapsed into one category (Yes-TOT). 
On average, 59 problems (61.5%) remained unsolved, and participants reported experi-
encing a TOT (Yes-TOT) (M = 30, SD = 12) on approximately the same number of problems 
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for which they reported experiencing No TOT (No-TOT) (M = 29, SD = 13), t(48) = 0.29, p = 
.77. Due to different (and low) frequencies of problems assigned each rating by different 
participants, Ease ratings of 1, 2, and 3 were collapsed into an easy problem category and 
Ease ratings of 4 and 5 were collapsed into a hard problem category. Participants rated 
more unsolved problems as easy (M = 33, SD = 15) compared to hard (M = 25, SD = 14), 
t(48) = 2.09, p = .04. TOT ratings did not reliably correlate with Ease ratings, r(47) = .19, n.s. 
That is, there was no reliable correlation between participants rating a problem as easy 
and also reporting a Yes-TOT for the same problem.
Day 2
Approximately 24 (+/- 2) hours later, participants returned to solve another set of prob-
lems, 48 new problems and an average of 59 old problems (i.e., Day 1 unsolved problems). 
The proportion of old problems that were solved at retest on Day 2 was defined as the 
Improvement Score (Smith & Blakenship, 1991). On average, participants solved 9 (SD = 
4) of 59 old problems, resulting in an average Improvement Score of 16%. 
TOT Specific Incubation Effect
In order to increase the number of observations per participant and compare solving pro-
portions across participants, we analyzed the Day 2 TOT specific solving behavior of only 
the participants (N = 35) who on Day 1 had more than 15 old problems in both Yes-TOT 
and No-TOT categories. This filter removed participants with less than 25% of their total 
TOT responses in either Yes-TOT or No-TOT category. As predicted, participants solved a 
reliably greater percentage of old problems for which they experienced a TOT on Day 1 
(M = 18%, SD = 9%) than Old problems for which they experienced No-TOT (M = 15%, 
SD = 9%), t(34) = 2.74, p = .01. However, participants did not reliably differ in solving old 
problems that they judged as easy (M = 16%, SD = 9%) compared to problems that they 
judged as hard (M = 15%, SD = 9%), t(48) = 0.34, p = .73. 
Some participants may have been more sensitive to the unconscious activation 
thought to underlie TOT judgments, thus more precise in reporting TOT experiences. 
These participants would be more likely to demonstrate a TOT specific incubation effect 
than participants who were less sensitive to unconscious activation. Using a median 
split, we examined whether participants who were more successful after the incubation 
period (i.e., N = 17, participants with an Improvement Score above the median) differed 
from participants who did not incubate well (i.e., N = 15, participants with an Improve-
ment Score below the median). Participants with Improvement Scores above the median 
solved a greater proportion of old problems for which they experienced a TOT on Day 1 
(M = 22%, SD = 6%) compared to problems for which they experienced No-TOT (M = 17%, 
SD = 6%), t(16) = 2.23, p = .04. However, participants with Improvement Scores below 
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the median did not reliably differ in solving old problems for which they experienced a 
TOT (M = 10%, SD = 5%) compared to No-TOT (M = 10%, SD = 5%), t(14) = 0.16, p = .89. 
That is, the participants who had the highest Improvement Scores demonstrated a TOT 
specific incubation effect that participants below the median Improvement Score did not 
demonstrate (see Figure 1). Here again, neither participant group (i.e., above or below the 
median Improvement Score) reliably differed in solving old problems that they judged as 
easy compared to problems that they judged as hard (all ts < 1.0). 
TOT and Insight Solving
Intuitive TOT judgments seemed to interact with the way in which participants reported 
solving old problems (either with insight or analysis). Specifically, when participants were 
unable to generate a solution but experienced a TOT on Day 1, on Day 2 they were mar-
ginally more likely to report solving those problems with insight (M = 67%, SD = 33%), 
compared to problems where they experienced No-TOT (M = 56%, SD = 34%), t(48) =1.89, 
p = .06 (see Figure 2).
Figure 1. Percent of problems solved on Day 2 for which participants, above and below 
the median Improvement Score, experienced a Yes – TOT or a No – TOT on Day 1.
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Discussion
When individuals fail to solve a problem during an initial attempt, intuitive TOT judgments 
reliably predict subsequent solving after a 24-hour incubation period. Further, TOT experi-
ences on Day 1 were related to reports of solving by insight on Day 2. When individuals 
were unable to generate the solution to a remote associate problem, but experienced 
a TOT (a sense that they were close, or that they had some solution related information 
in the back of their mind), they were more likely to solve those problems (compared to 
problems when they did not experience a TOT) after an overnight incubation period. 
Prior studies have indicated that sleep may facilitate memory reorganization (Ellenbo-
gen, Payne, & Stickgold, 2006) and specifically solutions by insight (Wagner, Gais, Haider, 
Verleger, & Born, 2004). In addition to the TOT specific incubation effect, experiencing a 
TOT was associated with marginally more frequent reports of insight solving, demon-
strating a potential relationship between intuition and insight. This experiment provides 
evidence that intuitive judgments about the problem solving process reliably indicate 
which problems are more likely to benefit from an incubation period, and to eventually be 
solved with a feeling of insight. Moreover, our results suggest that subthreshold solution 
Figure 2. Percent of problems solved when participants reported solving with insight on 
Day 2 for which participants experienced a Yes – TOT or a No – TOT on Day 1.
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related activation might underlie intuitive TOT judgments, incubation, and the experi-
ence of insight problem solving. Prior research has demonstrated that undetectable hints 
facilitate the solving of insight-like problems (Bowden, 1997).
Intuitive TOT judgments have been investigated in previous behavioral and neuro-
imaging studies to measure the dissociation between knowledge that one is subjectively 
aware of but unable to consciously retrieve. Behaviorally, when presented the definition 
of a low frequency word and asked to try to recall the word, participants that experienced 
a TOT were able to describe numerous features of the unrecalled word (i.e., some of the 
letters, the number of syllables, and the intonation) without being able to consciously 
retrieve the word (Brown & McNeill, 1966, Koriat & Leiblich, 1977). Neurally, when presented 
with a description of an esoteric proper noun and asked to retrieve the name, activation in 
the anterior cingulate and right middle frontal regions dissociated the intuitive TOT state 
from an explicit retrieval state. Increased activation in the prefrontal cortex is thought to 
reflect increased retrieval monitoring activity when retrieval failure results in a subjective 
feeling of partial recovery (Maril et al., 2001; 2005).
In the current study, a similar intuitive TOT judgment was used to assess an individual’s 
subjective feeling of partial semantic activation of solution-related information after a 
failed attempt to solve a remote associate problem. When an individual attempts to solve 
a remote associate problem, activation of the three problem words spread to semantically 
related associates in semantic memory.  This spreading activation eventually converges 
upon the common remote associate, which is the solution word. If the subthreshold ac-
tivation of solution-related information is not sufficient to support conscious awareness 
of the solution, the individual is unable to solve the problem (Ilg et al., 2007). However, 
this subthreshold solution related activation might become relatively more accessible 
during incubation and subsequent attempts at solving (Connor, et al., 1992). The current 
study suggests that the subthreshold solution related activation can give rise to a valid 
intuitive TOT experience.
Research with anagrams, rebuses, and remote associate problems has demonstrated 
incubation effects after an incubation period as short as 1 minute to as long as 24 hours 
(Sio & Ormerod, 2009). Prior studies have contrasted an incubation condition with a contin-
ued work condition. However, we were interested mainly in how intuitive TOT judgments 
would relate to incubation effects. Therefore, we assessed the specific differences between 
Yes- TOT and No-TOT reports on subsequent solving after an incubation period. Our re-
sults demonstrated that intuitive TOT judgments were sensitive, as they predicted which 
unsolved problems were more likely to be solved during a second attempt at problem 
solving, providing support for a TOT specific incubation effect. Regarding the mechanisms 
underlying incubation effects, there is less evidence supporting the continued conscious 
work hypothesis and stronger evidence in favor of the forgetting fixation hypothesis 
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(Olton, 1979; Smith & Blakenship, 1989; Vul & Pashler, 2007). In the current study, we did 
not induce fixation, although it remains possible participants still experienced internal 
fixation. On the other hand, perhaps continued unconscious processing can occur better 
when there is a basis from which to work, like subthreshold solution related activation 
that we assessed with the TOT judgments.
It is unlikely that our TOT specific incubation effect was based on continued conscious 
work that was carried out on problems that elicited TOT experiences. Clearly, failure to 
solve any problem indicates a need for continued effort, but no participant reported 
consciously working on or solving any problems (No-TOT or Yes-TOT) during the incuba-
tion delay. Moreover, it is unlikely that our TOT specific incubation effect was based on 
intuitive TOT experiences indicating the problems that should be easily solvable. On Day 
1, for each unsolved problem, in addition to making a TOT judgment, participants also 
rated how easy they thought the problem was in general (i.e., for an average student). 
These Ease ratings were not predictive of Day 2 solving. That is, unsolved Day 1 problems 
that were rated as easy were no more likely to be solved on Day 2 compared to problems 
that were rated as hard. Moreover, there was no reliable correlation between participants 
rating a problem as easy and also reporting a Yes-TOT for the same problem. Thus, the TOT 
specific incubation effect was not due to perceived ease of problems. Rather, the intui-
tive TOT judgment was likely based on subthreshold solution related activation that was 
insufficient to support immediate solution, but sufficient to support some component 
of incubation. That is not to say that participants had absolutely no subthreshold solu-
tion related activation for problems when they did not experience a TOT, but if there was 
activation, it was insufficient to influence their intuitive judgment.
It remains possible that other mechanisms of incubation effects related to uncon-
scious processing (i.e., opportunistic assimilation and forgetting fixation) may account 
for our results. Individuals may have assimilated solution related information during the 
incubation period. If unsolved problems that elicited a TOT experience reflected greater 
subthreshold solution related activation (relative to problems that elicited no TOT expe-
rience), it is plausible that during an incubation period these problems would have had 
an advantage in unconsciously assimilating cues from the environment that relate to the 
solution. However, the influence of opportunistic assimilation may have been negligible, 
considering the fact that no participant solved any problems during the incubation break. 
Given the problems are highly constrained (i.e., there is only one word that can fit with 
each problem word), the best “clue” would be the solution word itself, and would have 
led to solving.
According to the forgetting fixation hypothesis, incubation effects occur only when 
the critical misleading clues that led to the initial fixation are forgotten and other solution 
paths are explored. The incubation effects demonstrated in the majority of the aforemen-
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tioned studies only occurred when participants were presented with misleading clues 
that externally induced fixation (Olton, 1979; Smith & Blankenship, 1989; Vul & Pashler, 
2007). We did not externally induce fixation during the presentation of the problems in 
this study, but participants might have experienced an internal fixation, from strong as-
sociations to problem words, that prevented conscious access to the solution. Fixation 
could influence the TOT judgments. Specifically, on some trials strong fixation could block 
access to the weak solution-related activation, whereas on trials without fixation, even 
weak solution-related activation can be accessed. Thus, weak solution activation without 
solving will occur only on trials for which there is fixation. Thus the TOT judgment may 
have been signaling the presence both of subthreshold solution activation and strong 
fixation. If the fixation decays or is forgotten during incubation, then these trials are more 
likely to be solved on Day 2, so long as activation related to solution is maintained. Thus, 
our data are compatible with fixation forgetting, and cannot completely determine the 
specific mechanism of incubation.
In addition to the TOT specific incubation effect, our results demonstrate that ex-
periencing a TOT (compared to No-TOT) led to marginally greater reports of solving with 
insight, thereby demonstrating a potential relationship between intuition and insight. 
During a second attempt at solving, the subthreshold solution related activation that 
gave rise to an intuitive TOT judgment continued to summate until it broke the conscious 
threshold, marginally more often via a moment of insight compared to analytical pro-
cessing. It seems that both intuition and insight reflect related phases of unconscious 
processing: intuition (in this case, the TOT judgment), as the subjective experience of 
subthreshold solution related activation, and insight as the sudden shift of unconscious 
knowledge into conscious awareness via an Aha! moment. Even though the bases of 
intuitions are not accessible for conscious reflection, our data suggest that intuitive TOT 
judgments can reliably indicate which unsolved problems will benefit from an incuba-
tion period and which unsolved problems are more likely to be reported as solved with 
insight during a second attempt.
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